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Economics Archive
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People are getting tired of my
polemics against analytic philosophy, so I've
decided to throw my eggs against a different wall:
economics.
(Let me say that I don't actually think
that the wall will fall down. Let's don't get too upset.)
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Cited
without permission:
The tragedy of this is
that there is, within the bloated corpus of
economics, a perfectly nice slimmed-down
little science struggling to get out.
d^2
What
economics needs to lose is a lot of
metaphysical baggage, plus a lot of needy
f-type personalities.
d^2 |
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My economics
bibliography
Economics and me
What's up with these things I write about
economics?
I'm not an economist. I'm a consumer (or
sufferer) of economics, and not a producer. Economics has tremendous
prestige and is influential in many vitally important areas (notably
public policy, legal theory, and public opinion), so I watch
economics from the outside and try to figure out what's going on. My
studies could be described as a natural history of economics
(studying economics as it functions in its environment), or as
"science studies", or best of all, as "public philosophy".
(Note: This piece is introductory to
everything else here, more or less, and I'll leave it on
top until I come up with something better.)
Why am I wrong
about economics?
A troubling possibility is that the centrist
economists who claim to be liberals think that anyone to the left of
them is either insane or a Communist. During the Clinton
triangulation administration Krugman and DeLong spoke pretty
viciously about the non-centrist Democrats, and you sometimes wonder
whether the old liberals (15-20% of the US electorate) have been
disappeared from American life. The appropriation of the "liberal"
label by centrists would just be the final ratification of the
defeat of old liberalism.
How Economics
Forgot History
The
questions Hodgson talks about are of very general importance. Theory
and universals seems privileged over history and particulars everywhere (even among the decadent
dissidents in literary kink studies.) Up until 1950 or so
everyone was thinking about historicity, contingency, and particularity: Dewey, Whitehead, Hayek, Popper, Reichenbach, and
later on Donald Campbell, J. H. Hexter, and Stephen Jay Gould. But
with the rise of analytic philosophy and neo-classical economics,
this theme seems to have disappeared, and the difference between
historical and theoretical sciences seems to have been almost
forgotten.
Economics 101 as Political Indoctrination
I recently engaged in a long and
messy debate at
Crooked Timber and
Unfogged during which I was repeatedly accused of
misunderstanding contemporary economics and overstating its
conservative bias. I'm still figuring out what I think about all
this, but here are a few speculations about why my opinions are so
divergent from those of several others.
Economics and Philosophy of Science
Redman notes that, by contrast to physics, the
body of generally agreed-upon economics is not large -- and not only
that, economists from different schools do not even read one
another's work, so that there can be little dialogue or debate
between economists who hold opposing views, and still less the kind
of confrontation between opposing theories that might lead to a
unified view.
What Does Economic Rationality Do?
One problem
with the use of the economic individual as a stand-in for the
generic or universal individual is that the economic individual is
not a mean but an extreme. The economic individual is not in the
middle of a bell-curve, halfway between people who are not rational
enough and people who are in some way too rational, and the
stipulated economic individual is not even an attempt at a
representation of characteristic human behavior. The normative
definition of "rationality" never quite disappears, and the economic
individual always remains not only an extreme, but surreptitiously
(at least to some extent) an ideal
Tyler Cowen on
Rationality
Cowen believes that he is defending the economist's idea of
economic rationality, but his defense will only be
persuasive for
someone who is already committed to economics and wants to preserve
it. However, he may be correct in thinking that that's the only
audience he needs to bother with. Economics is institutionally
invulnerable, and everyone in the biz has a stake in the
profession's continued dominance. To an outsider it seems that Cowen
is running around patching leaks, but insiders are unlikely to be
upset by ad hoc epicycles and kludges.
Sen: Rationality and Freedom
My opinion is
that Sen has finally returned us to a reasonable position on
rationality, distribution, and social choice which could easily have
been attained fifty or sixty years ago (and probably was), and that
the long detour through formalization has been harmful. Without
speculating about Arrow's and Robbins' personal motives, it seems
clear that their work became central to economics to the degree that
the profession of economics, especially after 1970, did not want to
talk about distribution, but did want to make the best possible case
against state intervention in the economy.
Gintis et al: Moral Sentiments and Material Interests
To me the real
story is that there's never been any evidence at all that economics'
assumption of individual economic rationality is valid, and a lot of
evidence that it isn't. The rationalizations found in Friedman's Positive Economics have
allowed economists to rely thoughtlessly on these unproven
assumptions for about five decades, and if a few little experiments
are required to convince them to drop this inaccurate and unproven
default, that's cool with me. But it's a little like someone
cherry-picking Bible verses to make their point to the Vatican.
Lazear and
Durlauf: Economic Imperialism
Based
on my reading, at least five of the six points are highly
questionable. The whole issue of "What is really a science?" is
terribly confused by now, and strong claims like Lazear's can only
be thought of as ideological. The empiricism and testability of much
of neoclassical marginalism is very doubtful. The hypothesis of
"rational individuals" never was at all well-grounded, and it's now
under heavy attack.
Equilibrium has turned out to be a false, conservative standard (in
the physicist's sense of "conservative) which causes economists to
ignore and misunderstand historicity (see Mirowski, 1989, and
Mirowski, 2004, pp. 229-271). Finally, economics' incursions into
new territory have often been
ridiculous and
disastrous.
Why is there
Economics Rather than Nothing?
The internal criticisms of economics fall roughly into two
categories: bad mathematics (notably the laws of general
equilibrium), and empirical falsehood. Besides general equilibrium,
the economic concepts which Keen says are erroneous include “the
representative agent”, the downward-sloping demand curve, the
upward-sloping supply curve, diminishing marginal productivity, the
use of risk (as in gambling) as a proxy for uncertainty (what
Rumsfeld calls the “unknown unknowns”), Say’s Law and its various
revisions (which only work in a static economy with no accumulators
of wealth, no growth, and no capitalists), and the neoclassical
adaptations of Keynes' work.
Gary Becker's
Treatise on the Family
The
supposed child-commodity marks a major problem with Becker's theory.
Imagine someone raising goats, which are in fact commodities. You
put money and time into your goats, and with luck you can sell them
for a profit. Or you can kill or eat them. Or if they become a
nuisance, you can give them away or have them put to sleep.
Commodities don't really cause a big nuisance. Children, on the
other hand, are strictly money down the drain. You can never sell
them, and you can't eat them or get rid of them. They impose major
legal obligations, because you are both responsible for their care
and for their behavior -- yet once they become adults, they no
longer have any obligation to you.
When the
child-commodity turns eighteen, it becomes independent. At that
point the little child-commodity (which had been producing "psychic
income" -- p. 194) turns into human capital -- i.e., an independent
adult selling its labor on the market. At this point the parental
unit of human capital has nothing to show for his efforts. The
child-commodity upon which he had lavished so much money and time is
gone forever, to be replaced by an independent, competing unit of
human capital.
Quotations from
Chairman Becker
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Of course, most societies forbid
the purchase and sale of children, but it is easy to
forbid what would be uncommon" (page 29).
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The
economics profession's proud and almost total ignorance of history
and geography has rarely been better displayed than here. Even in
today's world, children are bought and sold (and not only for child
prostitution). In much of the pre-modern world, for example China,
children of poor families were often adopted by richer families to
supplement their labor force, with a cash payment usually given to
the poorer family.
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I am emersonj at gmail dot com.
Original materials copyright John J
Emerson
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