Practical reason contrasts with theoretical reason. Theoretical reason, which traces back at least to Plato, aims at timeless certainty and tries to attain its goals by decontexting its material, in the belief that the historical, contingent, particular context is less real than the timeless, universal core or foundation, and that truth can be found only at the deeper level.  Practical reason says that historical, particular, contingent, contexted actualities are just as real as timeless, universal, abstracted realities, and that understanding the real world world requires both kinds of investigation. 

For the unified understanding the universal truths are the introductory or the foundational level, and much of the real work in understanding actuality is done at the particularist level. Practical reason accepts that universality and certainty are seldom attainable about reality in its thickest and most contexted presentation, but denies that the universality and certainty of theoretical reason often satisfactorily reach actuality. One principle especially denied is the prejudice of most theoretical philosophers holding that if theoretical truth  and timeless certainty have not been attained, nothing at all is known. A second principle denied by practical philosophy is that particularist historical studies of actuality are, in the immortal phrase, nothing more than meaningless and ephemeral "social work and stamp collecting". (Few positivists or other theoreticists openly express themselves quite that strongly, and most recognize that "in practice" historicity and  particularly must be recognized. Theoreticist thinking tends to be evasive, confused, and inconsistent on the status of practical-historical thinking. All too often the theoreticist commitment remains intact even after the various patches and kludges and shims have been surreptitiously introduced to facilitate the essential bricolage required by anyone who tries to understand reality).

Practical reason, because of its acceptance of contingency and particularity, accepts the emergence of novelty into reality and is thus appropriate to the understanding of an open future. And since practical reason regards decontexting as costly and dangerous (though sometimes necessary),  practical reason does not privilege value-freedom or ethical neutrality of results or methods.

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Bibliography

Michel Meyer is the theoretician of practice. Meyer's Rhetoric, Language, and Reason is the best place to start for Meyer. Of Problematology is probably his most comprehensive work, though Questionnemente et Historicité, which I've just looked at so far, seems to have its own ambitions. From Logic to Rhetoric addresses analytic philosophy on its own ground. Meyer

Chaim Perelman's Justice, Law, and Argument and The Idea of Justice and the Problem of Argumentation are pretty good introductions to Perelman's thinking and perhaps are a better place to start than anything by Meyer. Perelman's ideas don't seem powerful or exciting, but have the advntage of being right.

Stephen Toulmin is the third member of my practical trinity. The Uses of Argument (Cambridge, 1958) and Knowing and Acting (Macmillan, 1976) are probably his best methodological books, while Cosmopolis (Free Press, 1990) is a more general, less technical exposition.

I have included a number of works of personhood, the self, etc., because "the self" emerges in rhetorical interaction with others, and it is impossible to find through a positivistic examination of the facts. The ability to deal with persons is one of the enormous advantages of rhetorical philosophy over positivistic or ontological philosophy.

Miscellaneous Excerpts on Method

Miscellaneous Excerpts on Personal Identity

Temporality

Booth, Wayne C., Modern Dogma and the Rhetoric of Assent, Chicago, 1974

Harre, Rom, Personal Being, Harvard, 1984.

Meyer, Michel, ed., From Logic to Rhetoric, John Benjamins, 1986.

Meyer, Michel, Rhetoric, Language, and Reason, Penn State, 1994.

Meyer, Michel, Of Problematology, Chicago, 1995.

Meyer, Michel, ed., De La Metaphysique a la Rhetorique, Brussels, 1986.

Meyer, Michel, "Science as a Questioning Process", Revue Internationale de Philosophie, Vol. 131 #2, 1980, pp. 49-89.

Meyer, Michel, "Dialectic and Questioning: Socrates and Plato", American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 17 #4, Oct. 1980, pp. 281-289.

Meyer, Michel, "The Interrogative Theory of Meaning and Reference", in Meyer, ed., Questions and Questioning. Walter de Gruyter, 1988, pp. 121-143.

Natanson, Maurice, and Johnstone, Henry W., Philosophy, Rhetoric, Argumentation, Penn State, 1965.

Nelson, John, Megill, Allan, and McCloskey, Donald, The Rhetoric of the Human Sciences, Wisconsin, 1987.

Perelman, Chaim, Justice, Law, and Argument, Reidel, 1980.

Perelman, Chaim, Le champ d'argumentation, Brussels, 1970.

Perelman, Chaim, The Idea of Justice and the Problem of Argumentation, Humanities Press, 1963.

Perelman, Chaim, "The Role of Decision in the Theory of Knowledge", in Perelman, 1963, pp. 88-97.

Perelman, Chaim, :The Rule of Justice" in Perelman, 1963, pp. 79-87.

Perelman, Chaim, "De la temporalite comme caractere de l'argumentation", in Perelman, 1970. (Excerpts)

Perelman, Chaim, "Logique formelle et logique informelle", in Meyer, ed., 1986, pp. 15-21.

Perelman, Chaim, "Les Cadres Sociaux de l'Argumentation", in Perelman, 1970, pp. 24-40.

Rorty, Richard, Consequences of Pragmatism, Minnesota, 1982.

Rorty, Richard, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton, 1979.

Rorty, Richard, "How many Grains Make a Heap", London Review of Books, Vol. 27 #2, January 20, 2005 (link).

Sabini, John, and Silver, Maury, Moralities of Everyday Life, Oxford, 1982.

Shapin, Steven, "Dear Prudence", London Review of Books, Vol 24 #2, January 24, 2002, pp.25-7. [Review of Toulmin's Return to Reason]

Shapin, Steven, A Social History of Truth, Chicago, 1994.

Shotter, John, Social Accountability and Selfhood, Blackwell, 1984.

Shotter, John, Cultural Politics of Everyday Life, Toronto, 1993.

Simons, Herbert W., The Rhetorical Turn, Chicago, 1990.

Toulmin, Stephen, Cosmopolis, Free Press, 1990.

Toulmin, Stephen, Return to Reason, Harvard, 2001.

Toulmin, Stephen, and Jonsen, Albert, The Abuse of Casuistry, California, 1988.

Toulmin, Stephen, and Goodfield, June, The Discovery of Time, Penguin, 1965.

Toulmin, Stephen, Knowing and Acting, Macmillan, 1976.

Toulmin, Stephen, The Uses of Argument, Cambridge, 1958.

Toulmin, Stephen and Janik, Allan, Wittgenstein's Vienna, Touchstone, 1973.

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