|
Amartya Sen
Rationality and Freedom
(Updated Oct. 22, 2006)
| It is centrally important for
social choice theory to relate formal analysis to
informal and transparent examination. (pp. 73-4) A
deep complementarity between formal and informal
reasoning – so central to the social sciences – is well
illustrated by developments in modern social choice
theory. (pp. 96-7)
Rationality and Freedom
Amartya Sen
Harvard 2004 |
Sen's recognition of complementarity here is very welcome -- many
formal thinkers aspire to the transcendent status of quantum
mechanics, and are thus hostile to the very idea of natural-language
interpretation. All of Sen's revisions of neoclassical economics are
congenial to me, but even though Sen is classified as orthodox, it
seems to me (granted that I'm a systematically informal thinker)
that his innovations are actually quite destructive of large parts
of the orthodox consensus.
My conclusions are based on the first two
chapters of Sen's book, which are the ones intended for a general
audience. The first presents Sen's critique of economists' concepts
of rationality, and proposes a replacement. The second rescues and
revises social choice theory and directs attention to questions of
distribution.
The "rational fool" definitions of rationality
Sen criticizes are a.) rationality as internal consistency of
choice, b.) rationality as maximization of expected utility, and c.)
rationality as maximization of self-interest. To anyone outside
economics these definitions have always seemed wrong, first because
a prudent psychopath could easily satisfy all three of them, and
second because they do not describe actual human behavior and
are merely assumed "to simplify the modeling" (p. 23). For decades
economists have relied on Friedman's argument that these simplifying
assumptions are, like Newton's, unproblematic ("Introduction to
Positive Economics"), but Steve Keen (Debunking Economics,
Ch. 7) has shown that this is not the case.
Sen develops his criticisms of these proposed
forms of rationality with great diligence and meticulousness. His
suggested alternative rationality (p. 4) is "the discipline of
subjecting one's choices -- of actions as well of objectives,
values, and priorities -- to reasoned scrutiny". This strikes me as
quite acceptable, and far superior to the definitions he criticizes,
albeit a little thin. (More on this below).
The questions about welfare economics are more
complicated. For decades mainstream economics has not tried to
evaluate economic from a social or "general welfare" point of view,
but only from the point of view of a population of unique and
unrelated individuals. The most aggressive possible statement
about general welfare would be Pareto equivalency: the goal should
be to attain a state in which no individual can be helped without
hurting some other individual. What is specifically excluded is the
possibility (accepted by early utilitarians) that certain social
changes are good because those helped are helped more than those
hurt are hurt (for example, taxing the rich to pay for medical care
for the poor). This line of thought questions all governmental
attempts to attain reduce poverty and suffering or attain other
social goals unless they cost no one anything.
Commentator Henry Evans writes:
It is incorrect to
suggest that economists have abandoned the
notion of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency (i.e.,
that there are some changes that increase
welfare overall despite decreasing it for
some people). This is, after all, the main
justification for removing or reducing trade
barriers.
The problem with Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is
that economics has nothing to say about
whether it is just in any particular
instance. Justice is just not within the
subject matter of economics. |
From my point of view, this makes
matters worse. In other words, if it's a matter of
justifying a practice beneficial to business, the
summation and comparison of of utilities is allowed, and social choice is possible.
It's only when anyone tries to point out that a dollar
has more utility to a poor man than to a rich man, and
that a shot of penicillin can have infinitely more value
than a glass of wine, that comparisons are disallowed.
(I presume that Kaldor-Hicks efficiency compares dollar
values and calculates a net, whereas what I was talking
about required the interpersonal comparison of actual
utility, not defined by dollar value, and I suppose I
should have said it that way.)
The fact that justice is not part
of the subject matter of economics means that people who
use economics as their main window on reality will
behave randomly or indifferently with regard to justice,
but rationally with regard to self-interest, and in
general will tend to be unjust. I do not regard this as
a hypothetical or theoretical problem, but as an actual
one. |
This weakening of welfare economics is
theoretically grounded on two principles: Lionel Robbins' conclusion
that 'Every mind is inscrutable to every other mind and no common
denominator of feelings is possible', (p. 71) and Kenneth
Arrow's proof that "even some very mild conditions of
reasonableness could not be simultaneously be satisfied by any
social choice procedure" (p. 69). Since Robbins has shown that
there is no way of precisely measuring relative utility, and since
Arrow has shown that there can no algorithm for voting which would
make a rigorously fair democratic decision procedures possible, all
"social choice" (especially if it ends up mandating redistribution)
will be "inescapably arbitrary or intellectually despotic" (p.
95).
These principles are also meticulously
analyzed and criticized by Sen, and he replaces them with better
principles which make social choice and the comparison of individual
welfare possible. To me the details are not terribly important; from
my point of view I would say that he simply points out that both
Robbins and Arrow were "defeatist perfectionists" who set their
standards so high that they could only fail.
I find Sen's conclusions quite acceptable,
though not terribly exciting -- the interesting question for me is
how Sen's work fits into economics. His 1998 Nobel Prize shows
that he's been quite well-received, but it seems to me that his work
should wreak quite a lot of havoc. For example, the economic
notions of rationality rejected by Sen serve quite well to "simplify
the modeling" of component individuals for someone trying to define
a rigorous formal economic model, whereas Sen's definition
("subjecting one's choices to reasoned scrutiny") hands the economic
theorist a can of worms. Likewise, while Sen's ways of comparing utility or making social choice decisions
are completely OK as far as I am concerned, they seem unlikely to be
useful to an economist hoping to weave an rigorous,
elaborate theoretical structure. Sen has seemingly renounced the
mathematical virtuosity and the claim to rigor and certainty which have
been the economist's stock in trade for decades, in order to move
toward a different model of economics which I would describe as
commonsensical.
That's presumably not what Sen would
say. While he believes (unlike many technical economists) that
the dialogue between common sense and formal economics is
valuable, he also believes that his formal argumentation is a
necessary part of the debate, and (for example) that rationality is still in
some sense maximization. My opinion is that Sen has
finally returned us to reasonable positions on rationality,
distribution, and social choice which could easily have
been attained fifty or sixty years ago (and probably was), and
that the long detour through formalization has been harmful.
Without speculating about Arrow's and Robbins' personal motives,
it seems clear that their work became central to economics
because the profession of economics, especially
after 1970, did not want to talk about distribution, but did
want
to make the best possible case against state intervention in the
economy.
| A final question occurs to me.
The rational fool
Gary
Becker was awarded the economics quasi-Nobel in
1992; Merton and Scholes, the not-quite-felons of
Long-term Capital Management, received theirs in 1997;
Sen received his in 1998. Does this represent some sort
of ethical power struggle within the profession, or are
economists unaware of any incongruity? Was Sen's prize
intended to divert public attention from Merton and
Scholes? |
|
Link
Tyler Cowen
on rationality (blogged
here)
Edward Lazear and
Steven Durlauf on rationality and other topics
Arrow's impossibility theorem (Wiki)
An old Delong / Sawicki thread on these topics
I am emersonj at gmail dot com.
Original materials copyright John J
Emerson
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