TRANSLATION
The Onggirat then joined Jamuqa. They gathered with the Ikires, the Qorulas, the Dörben, the Tatar, the Qadagin, and the Selji’üt tribes at the Gan[iii][iii] River. Together they named Jamuqa Gur Qan and plotted to attack us. They made a covenant at the *Tülber[iv][iv] river and swore the following oath: “May any of our covenant who leaks this plan collapse like this riverbank and be felled like this forest!” After these words, they all lifted their feet to trample the bank, and swung their swords to cut down the trees. Galloping their steeds the charging army rode off.
B
[At this time our forces had a man named Taqaiqa in Jamuqa’s army.] The Emperor’s Jeuret follower *Cha’u’ur[v][v] was his relative and went to visit. They happened to be riding together. *Cha’u’ur did not know about the plot. Taqaiqa tapped him on the side with his whip. *Cha’u’ur looked back to see Taqaiqa looking at him. Realizing Taqaiqa wanted to say something, Cha’u’ur dismounted as if to urinate. Taqaiqa then told him about the river covenant, saying, [“The situation is now critical. Where are you going to go?” *Cha’u’ur was alarmed; on his way home, he encountered the Qorula Yesügei. He told him about the situation and was going to go to tell the Emperor.] [vi][vi] Yesügei said, “The son of my chief wife has gone to Qulan Buqa[vii][vii][and the day of his return is not known.] Around me I only have children and my servant Qoridai.” So he had Qoridai swear an oath and sent him riding a grey donkey with a white horse following, saying, “When you get there speak only with the Emperor or his Qatun, or to my son-in-law Qasar[viii][viii].” And he told him “If you leak this to anyone else I will split your spine and cut you in half at the waist.” The oath finished, Qoridai left. On the way he ran into the military perimeter of Qulan Ba’atur and *Qara-mergitei[ix][ix] and was captured by their sentries, but gained his release because of long friendship. He was accordingly given an otter-colored stallion, and was told, “ This horse can save you if you are pursued, and in pursuit can catch anyone. Mount and ride.” He encountered a train of white felt wagon-yurts heading toward Jamuqa’s camp. Men from the train came out to chase *Cha’u’ur, but *Cha’u’ur escaped at a gallop. When he reached the Emperor he told him everything about the plot mentioned above.[x][x] The Emperor then gathered a force to meet Jamuqa’s troops. They fought at the Qailar Teni-Qorqan[xi][xi] steppe and Jamuqa was defeated. Jamuqa fled, and the Onggirat tribe submitted to us.
C 1202 A.D. The Emperor deployed troops at the Ulqui-Shireljin River[xii][xii] to attack the Alchi Tatar and the Cha’an Tatar. In the summer he camped his troops at *Bijan[xiii][xiii]. He began by making his troops swear their agreement to the following: “If we defeat them chase them north. If you see abandoned goods scattered about, you must pay them no heed. When the military business is finished, the plunder will be divided fairly.” After the great[xiv][xiv] victory, the Emperor’s clansmen Altan, Quchar, and Daritai violated their oath. The Emperor sent the two commanders Qubilai and Jebe to seize all their plunder and distribute it among the troops.
D In the fall the Naiman Buiruq Qahan joined with the Merkit chief Toqto’a-beki and the Dörben, Tatar, Qadagin, and Selji’üt tribes, together with A’uchu-ba’atur[xv][xv], Quduqa-beki,[xvi][xvi] and others in order to attack ourselves and Ong Qahan. The Emperor began by sending riders to climb up and keep watch from Mount Negen-Güiletu, Mount Chekcher, and Mount Chiqürqei.[xvii][xvii] A rider came from Mount Chiqürqei reporting that the Naiman were gradually approaching. From Ulqui-shireljin the Emperor and Ong Qan moved their forces inside the Barrier.[xviii][xviii] Ong Qahan’s son Ilqa stayed behind the northern Barrier; only after occupying a high ridge did he set up camp. Buiruq was confident, saying, “Their army is scattered; once they are gathered together we can roll them up.” At this time A’uchu and Qodu,[xix][xix] under Emel’s command,[xx][xx] came to join the vanguard. They were about to attack but they saw that Ilqa’s army’s situation was strong, so they returned. Ilqa also tried to cross the barrier and join our troops to make ready for war. The baggage-wagons were moved to a different location. The Emperor and Ong Qahan relied on the Aral barrier[xxi][xxi] as a bulwark.] There was a great battle at Köyiten[xxii][xxii] steppe . The enemy raised a windstorm. The storm suddenly turned to snow. Their blinded troops confusedly fell into ditches and tumbled into ravines as they retreated. On the way Jamuqa, leading his own troops in retreat and happening to encounter the tribes who had made him Qahan, plundered them. E In the winter the Emperor went out of the barrier and camped at Mount Abji’a-köteger.[xxiii][xxiii] Ong Qahan camped at the Berke desert.[xxiv][xxiv]At this time the Emperor and Prince Jochi wanted to marry Jochi to Ong Qahan’s daughter Cha’ur-beki, and Ong Qahan’s grandson Tusaqa also sought the hand of the Emperor’s daughter, the princess Qojin-beki. Ong Qahan rejected these requests. F From this time there was a little distance between the Emperor and Ong Qahan. Jamuqa heard about this and went to Ilqa, saying “ My anda often sends envoys to make deals with Tayang Qan of the Naiman. For you, no good can come from this. If you now attack him, I will stand shoulder to shoulder with you.” At this time Ilqa was living apart. He went to meet his father Ong Qahan. The Emperor’s kinsmen Daritai-otchigin, Altan, and Qochar, together with Taqai[xxv][xxv], *Qurqaila, *Qadarkid, Muqur-Qaurun[xxvi][xxvi] , and Jamuqa were all opposed to us. They spoke to Ilqa as follows: “We all intend to assist you to the limit of our power in punishing the sons of Queen Mother Hö’elün.” Ilqa accepted their offer, and making camp within a circle of wagon-yurts they laid their plans. They sent Sayiqan-tödö’en to speak to Ong Qahan. Ong Qan said, “Jamuqa is a smooth-talking, unreliable man. He should not be trusted.” Ilqa sent back the reply, “Jamuqa has a mouth and a tongue;[xxvii][xxvii] for what reason should I not trust him?” Several times he sent men to speak with Ong Qahan; Ong Qahan said, “If I forbid you, you will not obey me. My life is over[xxviii][xxviii]; now I am dependent on others. I only hope that my tired old scattered bones find a peaceful resting place. Now the chatter is unceasing. You should yourself do what you are able to do; don’t give me grief. [Now under a different command, my pastures will all be burned”].[xxix][xxix] G 1203 A.D. In the spring Ong Qahan craftily said, “Earlier he proposed a marriage alliance, but I rejected it. Now it should be accepted. Wait until he comes to the confirmation feast, and then seize him. Then he sent Buqatai and Kichalai[xxx][xxx] to invite the Emperor. The Emperor assembled ten riders to accompany him on the visit. He stayed one night in the camp of Father Monglik. When the next day came he conferred with Father Monglik. He sent a messenger to answer Ong Qahan, saying “My herds are starved and weak and I must tend them. Isn’t it enough to send one man to celebrate the feast?” After sending the messenger the Emperor returned home. H At that time Ong Qahan’s attendant Yeke-Chaqaran[xxxi][xxxi] learned of the plot against the Emperor. Returning home he told his wife, adding “If someone were to leak word of this to the Emperor, who can tell what would happen?” His son Ilqan[xxxii][xxxii]stopped him, saying “This is just talk. But I’m afraid others might think it’s serious.” Yeke-Chaqaran’s herdsman Kishilik[xxxiii][xxxiii] happened to come by bringing kumiss and, unobserved, overheard what was said. He asked his brother Badai “What was this that they were discussing just now? Might you know something about it?” Badai said, “I don’t know anything.” Chaqaran’s second son Narin was sitting outside his yurt sharpening his arrowheads. Badai heard him curse, saying [“The tongue-cutter! We shouldn’t be talking right now! Today’s business is already decided. Whose mouth should they be silencing? ”]. Badai said to Kishilik “We know now. Let us visit the Emperor and inform him”. They then went to their own yurt to plan the trip. They only had one lamb, which they slaughtered. They chopped up and burned their bed frame to cook it. That night they sped to the Emperor to report the plot, saying “Ong Qahan is plotting against the Prince[xxxiv][xxxiv]. The scheme has been decided on.” I Upon hearing this, the Emperor stationed his troops at the Aral barrier and quickly shifted his baggage-wagons to the upper reach of the Shireljin River[xxxv][xxxv]. He sent Jelme ahead as the advance guard along north side of Mount Mau-yundur.[xxxvi][xxxvi] Ong Qahan also sent troops along Mau-yundur’s south side from Mount Hula’ut and Mount Buraqut.[xxxvii][xxxvii] At this time *Taichu and Yeder[xxxviii][xxxviii] were pasturing horses and saw Ong Qahan’s troops coming. They immediately went to inform the Emperor. He then moved his troops to the Qaraljit steppe[xxxix][xxxix] . [He had not yet readied his troops when the sun went behind the mountain. As soon as his troops were in order he went out to fight.] First the Emperor defeated the troops of the Jirgin[xl][xl] tribe, and next he defeated the troops of the Dongqayit tribe.[xli][xli]He then defeated Qori-Shilemun-taishi’s troops, and advanced to press Ong Qahan, who took a defensive position. Ong’s son Ilqa came charging up to strike the Emperor’s line. Our troops shot him in the cheek. J His situation gravely precarious, [Ong Qan] pulled in his troops and retreated. The Emperor also withdrew to the Ornu’u-*kelgelge[xlii][xlii] , following the Qalqa[xliii][xliii]downstream and dividing his troops into two columns. The Emperor himself led 2300 riders on the south bank, while the Uru’ut and Mangqut tribes with 2300 troops followed the north bank. As a Onggirat son-in-law the Emperor first sent a messenger to their leaders Temüge and Emel,[xliv][xliv] saying “If you come and obey me your daughter “faces” and your niece hostages[xlv][xlv] will live on. Otherwise we will attack you.” He then proceeded to the Tüngge[xlvi][xlvi] marsh at Torqa-qorqa[xlvii][xlvii]to bivouac his troops. [Having survived Ong Qan’s attack, Temüjin gathers his forces and issues a challenge to Ong Qan and his supporters, including his relatives the Jurkin or Jirgin. In a sneak attack he destroys Ong Qan’s forces and becomes Chinggis Qan, and after mopping up the Naiman and the Merkit turns his attention to the sedentary lands of Khwarizm, the Tangut Hsi-hsia, and Chin China]. COMMENTS A: THE MONGOL SOURCES As a primary source based on a Mongol original, the Sheng-wu Ch’in-cheng Lu, for all its problems, gives us a version of the Mongols’ own understanding of the sources of Chinggis’ power. These are not what we would expect. Neither here nor in the Secret History is Temüjin credited with extraordinary valor or prowess, and supernatural forces are virtually absent. (When belief in such forces is present, it usually backfires on the believer). The SW is a chronicle, not a poem, and is quite soberly written. (The SH is likewise a chronicle, and its many poetic passages are always in the voices of characters in the story). In these texts we are shown a man who attracts followers by his honor, fairness, and generosity, and whose severity is always grounded on righteousness. (What we can further deduce from these same texts is a patient, disciplined man of iron will who achieved his goals through extraordinary shrewdness, ruthlessness and treachery.) Rather than a heroic epic,[xlviii][xlviii] what we see in the SW is a skeletal account of the making and dissolution of alliances, the timely delivery of crucial military intelligence, and battles and their outcomes. Like any source, the SW requires critical examination. This text is believed to be a Chinese translation of a Mongol chronicle, the Altan Debter, which was also used by Rashid ad-Din. (The SW and Rashid ad-Din generally report the same events in the same sequence, and many of the same petty details are similiarly reported in the two works; the SH account frequently deviates widely from theirs.) Pelliot has concluded that the Chinese SW translation was probably produced in Khubilai’s Chinese realm in the third quarter of the 12th century.[xlix][xlix] In the sections he has translated Pelliot makes a number of emendations (as does Wang Kuo-wei). Some of these are based on text variants and can easily be justified, but others are more conjectural and might be questioned. Likewise, when the Yuan Shih provides a fuller or more intelligible interpretation of a SW passage, it might because the YS editors had access to other sources or a superior text; but it is also possible that they made sense of a choppy passage by rewriting it on their own authority. Pelliot consistently attributes problems to various sorts of damage during transmission, whereas I am inclined to believe that, due to the incapacities of the translator or translators, the SW Chinese text was never very good.[l][l] The most serious problems with the SW and the SH are the result of their late composition under Chinggisid auspices. The Altan Debter, Rashid ad-Din’s work, the SH, the and probably the SW were all official documents of the new Mongol state, and as such presented slanted pictures of the events described. To begin with, these chronicles served as charters of nobility for the leading Mongol families in Mongol China and Persia. Rashid, writing toward the end of the 12th century (at least two generations after Chinggis’ death), made extensive use of oral reports from eminent Persian Mongols, and often listed the contemporary descendents of Chinggis’ supporters. One can surmise that the contributions of figures without descendants in the Ilqanate would tend to be passed over or minimized, whereas the roles of the ancestors of Rashid’s important contemporaries would tend to be exaggerated. (The YS also details the subsequent family histories of the companions of Chinggis Qan, and is to be suspected to similar distortions. The YS is heavily dependent on the SW for the early Mongol period, but also includes information from other sources.) A second and more important problem is the minimization of the contributions of figures whose deeds might prove embarrassing to Temüjin. To begin with, the progress of narrative is rather clumsy because Temüjin must be made the central character, requiring Ong Qan’s history to be told in flashbacks both in the SW and the SH. In fact, right up until the deciding battle between the two, Ong Qan was a more important figure than Temüjin, and an impartial history would begin the story with Ong Qan and gradually introduce Temüjin. From the texts we have it is difficult to see why Jamuqa should have been able to play such a major role at all. He first appears on the scene at the head of twenty thousand troops (SH 104), and he must have had great victories which allowed him to compete with Temüjin for Ong Qan’s favor and to lead the opposition to the two of them, but we are told nothing of these deeds. Both Qasar and Monglik’s seven sons assuredly performed major feats in support of Temüjin during the latter’s rise to power, but we are not given any details of these either. The shifting loyalties of Ong-Qan’s brother Jaqa-gambu are hard to trace in the sources, but he seems clearly to have given important help to Temüjin at certain stages in his career; both these events and Jaqa-gambu’s ultimate fate are obscured in the sources. I believe that these stories are repressed because a full telling of their stories would put Temüjin in a bad light. [li][li] The two chronicles are unembarrassed by Temüjin’s cruelty and also are not afraid to show him in a position of weakness and dependency. But both sources need to show Temüjin as a strong, loyal, generous leader, and episodes showing him to be ungrateful, devious, or treacherous would destroy this picture. Righteousness was crucial to the Mongols. In both the SH and the SW one of the longest single sections is Temüjin’s indictment of Ong Qan, within which he puts Ong Qan in the wrong by showing that Temüjin had helped Ong Qan more than the latter had helped him, but that Ong Qan had proved ungrateful. (Elsewhere Ong Qan likewise indignantly denounces the disloyal supporters led by his own brother Jaqa Gambu: PH pp. 416-7.) But in fact Temüjin destroyed everyone who helped him on the way up except for those who were willing to subordinate themselves to him absolutely. (In Hambis’ delicious understatement, “Chinggis Qan was not someone who shared”).[lii][lii] A fuller account of the stories of Jamuqa, Qasar, Teb Tenggri and his brothers, and Jaqa Gambu would have cast doubt on Temüjin’s righteousness. The most serious problem with the sources is a large number of discrepancies between the Altan Debter tradition (represented by Rashid, the SW, and the YS) and the SH on the dating and sequence of events. It is extremely difficult to match events in one of these traditions to events in the other; for example, SH 141 includes elements scattered in four different places in the SW. I tentatively tried to match the SH and SW versions of the period between Temüjin’s first battle with Jamuqa (SW pp.15-30, SH 120-- 129) and Temüjin’s retreat to Baljuna after his first battle with Ong Qan. (SW p. 100, SH 177). After labeling the SW events (and elements of events) from A to Z, I rearranged them according to the SH sequence. The resulting sequence was A, E, K, O, Q, R, F, W, X, Y, Z, J, C, B, I, M, T, U, G, H, D. (Elements L, N, P, S, V of the SW were not found in the SH). This sequencing is quite provisional and might well need revision on points of detail, but I think that it is clear enough that at least one of the accounts is scrambled. In the SW Temüjin fights against the Tatar (alone or in coalition) six times in all: pp. 43, 68-9, 73-4, 75, 81, and 82. In the SH the Tatar are involved in only three battles: in SH 133, SH 141-3, and SH 153. SH 133 neatly match SW p. 43; this is the battle in which Ong Qan and Temüjin received their titles from the Chinese. The event in SH 153 is clearly the same event as that in SW p. 81 (section C in my translation), and probably the same as the battle at Dalan-nemurges in SW pp. 73-4 (not translated); this is the battle after which Daritai and the others are stripped of their plunder. But in the SH this event takes place after the battle at Köyiten, whereas in the SW it takes place before it. The third battle, in SH 141-3 at Köyiten, seems to merge three battles reported in SW pp. 68-9, 75, and 82: the first (not in my translation) against an alliance at Buira after an oath at the Alqui spring; the second (my section B) against Jamuqa the Gur Qan at Qailar Teni-qorqan, and the third (my section D) against a coalition at Köyiten. I believe that these problems derive from orality, but in a different sense than has been so often said. Both sources are “oral history”: late paste-ups of material gathered long after the fact from a variety of oral sources by compiler-editors who did not have first-hand knowledge of the events. After the materials had been gathered, the two editors put the pieces together in a connected story as best they could. It can easily be shown that this is the case in the SH. Onon notes that in SH 199 and 202 events taking place in the year 1218 A.D. are reported for the year 1206 A.D. Both of these are Tiger years, and the compiler obviously simply put these events in the wrong Tiger year. Such a mistake could not have been made by anyone with direct experience of these events; these errors lead one to suspect that the SH was not produced by Temüjin’s young contemporary Shigi Qutuqu and may well have been was produced later than 1228. From this point of view it seems likely that SH 141-3 merges at least two different battles against Temüjin, one fought by a coalition at Buira and the other fought against the Gur Qan Jamuqa at Köyiten. But it is also possible that the SW in some cases presents two different reports of a single battle as two different battles: for example, in the SH Daritai is stripped of his plunder after a battle against the Tatar at Dalan-nemurges. A battle against the Tatar at Dalan-nemurges is reported on SW pp. 73-4, but Daritai is stripped of his plunder after a different battle against the Tatar on p. 81. Since the second passage has certain textual problems, perhaps it describes the same battle, and should be moved up to pp. 73-4. Furthermore, the two problems are not mutually exclusive: perhaps in some places the SH merges, whereas in other places the SW splits. All these questions require further investigation.
B: GEOGRAPHY By and large the rivers and lakes named here can be easily identified, whereas the mountains, valleys, and steppes can only roughly be located in relation to these bodies of water. However, the broad geographical significance of the passage is clear. Most of the action takes place in the general area of Lake Hulun and Lake Buir, at the eastern end of the Mongol world and on the northwestern frontier of Chin China. (This area is still a frontier area, at the intersection of Mongolia, Chinese Inner Mongolia, Chinese Manchuria, and Russian Siberia.) Sections A and B take place north of lake Hulun, near the present Gen, Telbür, and Hailar rivers, all of which flow west into the Ergune. Most of the rest of the action takes place south and east of Lake Buir, near the Qalqa, Urgen, Sheljin, and Guiler rivers. When Ong Qan returned to the Berke desert in section E, however, he traveled west several hundred miles to his base area near the Tuula River. The Tatar, in alliance with the Chin Chinese, had earlier dominated the Chin northwestern frontier, but during the 1190’s the Chin and the Tatar had come into conflict, and in 1196 Ong Qan and Temüjin had capitalized on the situation by defeating a Tatar army fleeing from the Chin.[liii][liii] From that point on Ong Qan’s Kereyit, with Temüjin’s help, began making their claim to control of the frontier area -- together with the plunder and/or subsidies coming from China. In the present passage they are the aggressors in the Tatar homeland, several hundred miles east of their own lands. Of the others named here, Altan, Seche-beki, Jamuqa and many others were kin and old friends of Temüjin who were unwilling to accept his demand for sole leadership and total control. The Selji’üt, Qadagin, Dörben, and Onggirat were native to the area east of the two lakes. During the period of Tatar dominance they had been enemies of that tribe, but now they had allied themselves with the weakened Tatar in order to resist the Kereyit and the Mongols. The Merkit and the Naiman, by contrast, came from even farther away than the Kereyit and the Mongols: the Naiman homeland was west and north of the Kereyit homeland, and the Merkit homeland was north of it. These tribes had joined the alliance knowing that if the Kereyit were to succeed in seizing control of the Chinese frontier, they would be in a good position to control all of the Mongol tribes.
C: CONCLUSIONS In the Mongol world power did not come from control of territory or of stores of wealth but from military leadership. The sources, especially the SW, are extraordinarily attentive to decisions to affiliate or disaffiliate, to security and breaches of security, and to loyalty and treachery. Allegiance could not be assumed on the basis either of kinship, or of hereditary vassalage, or of territorial contiguity. Any tribe, and any warrior with or without his tribe, could affiliate with any war chief as long as a state of feud was not in force between them. However, these affiliations were only temporary: in the course of the brief passage I have translated, the Onggirat change sides at least three times. Almost the only coercive hold any leader had on his followers was the threat to appropriate, adopt, enslave or massacre the women and children which he had under his protection. In the Mongol world there was no cropland, no disarmed peasantry attached to the land, no need to work the land, no lords defined by their holdings of land, no significant fortifications or defensive bulwarks, and no stores of food or wealth except for livestock. Livestock are not only moveable, but require constant movement as they exhaust the grazing lands, and Mongols carried all their other property with them as they followed the herds. Under these circumstances, the possession of wealth and the control of territory were extraordinarily volatile. On the one hand, a bold raider could steal or stampede much of the real wealth of a careless clan or individual. On the other, a militarily strong qan could move his tribe and its flocks onto a weaker tribe’s grazing land without the necessity of protecting his home base. (By contrast, a sedentary lord had to defend both his stores of food and the crops in the ground). Except during wartime and war councils, Mongols lived in small groups widely dispersed over vast areas, and no leader had direct means of control over anyone except his own camp. Warfare could not be defensive and was always offensive, and the main events were the surprise attacks of one transient coalition on another. For the civilized peoples bordering on the steppe from China and Iran to Greece and Rome, the volatile, ever-changing steppe world seemed nightmarishly chaotic, and it is not hard to see why. Even in the very brief passage translated here there are numerous decisions to affiliate or disaffiliate. The fluidity and voluntarism of coalition-building did not mean the system was not harsh. Spies and traitors were summarily killed. Smaller and weaker tribes normally lived near the more powerful tribes, and their families could thus be held hostage[liv][liv]. Early in the SW we see the Jeuret tribe destroyed mostly because they could not decide whether to affiliate with the Tayyichi’ut or with Temüjin’s Kiyat.[lv][lv] In Section J above threats are used to impress the Onggirat into Temüjin’s coalition. This tribe was divided; Temüjin’s wife was from the Onggirat, as were many Mongol wives. Temüjin received a great deal of support from individual Onggirat, but the tribe switched back and forth repeatedly. In Section A above, the Onggirat do not join Temüjin because Temüjin’s brother Qasar had plundered them. In Section B they do join him after his defeat of Jamuqa. But they must have deserted again at some point, because in Section J he has to force their allegiance. (Tribes which changed sides were put on the front lines – because they were not trusted, and in order to prove themselves. Of the tribes listed in this passage, Ong Qan’s Dongqayit (section I) had at one time been affiliated with Temüjin[lvi][lvi] and were for that reason put on the front lines, and the same is probably true of Ong’s Jirgin and Temüjin’s Mangqut and Uru’ut in section J.)[lvii][lvii] When Qasar, Temüjin’s full brother, is spoken of as “living apart” in Section A, it means that he was not under Temüjin’s command. (Likewise, Ilqa-Senggum in section F was not under his father’s command). Apartness does not mean enmity, but it does mean freedom from control, with enmity as one possibility. (When Temüjin separates from Jamuqa in SH 118, he is refusing subordination and implicitly inviting Jamuqa’s other followers to desert him, and Temüjin and Jamuqa are soon at war). After he was rebuked by Temüjin for his attack on the Onggirat, Qasar almost certainly joined Temüjin’s enemies. The SW does not say so explicitly, but later in the text he is shown rejoining Temüjin before the second battle with Ong Qan, leaving his family in Ong Qan’s control. Some sources say that his family had been captured, but it is more likely that Qasar had fought against his brother in the Temüjin’s first battle against Ong Qan -- sections I and J above. (Oddly enough, so did the Onggirat whom he had driven into Ong’s camp)[lviii][lviii]. At one point in his career Qasar came very near death at his brother’s hands – his life being saved at the last minute by their mother Hö’elün (SH 244). In the Mongol world, the significance of blood relationship was highly ambiguous. Noble “bone” clans were defined by paternal descent, which accounts for the long genealogies in the SH. However, all members of noble clans had a claim to clan leadership and thus were each other’s potential, and usually actual, enemies. At the beginning of his career Temüjin led an army including most of his kin (SH 122), but he ultimately was responsible for the deaths of many or even most of his male relatives – notably, all known members of the Jurkin. (This is sometimes spoken of as an innovation of his, but all strong Qans became so in part by eliminating their competing kin; Ong Qan, who killed two of his brothers and frequently was in conflict with the other two, is a prime example).[lix][lix] Tribes were often divided between two coalitions – either an individual or a subtribe could independently join the coalition to which the tribe belonged. While a tribe’s divided affiliation might a sign of disunity and weakness, the story is really more complex than that. Faced with an uncertain outcome, a tribe might in effect hedge its bets by giving some support to both sides. That way the tribe would survive regardless of the outcome. For weak tribes this could be simply a survival strategy, but relatively strong tribes might adopt this strategy in the hope that they will be able to profit from the destruction of one side or the other. Tribal factional disputes could be integrated into this strategy: the sub-tribal leader affiliated with the winning coalition would become leader of the whole tribe after dispatching the sub-tribal leader affiliated with the losing coalition. I believe that these considerations explain the support Temüjin got in section B above from the Qorulas Yesügei and Qara-mergitei, even though their clan was affiliated with Temüjin’s enemy Jamuqa. Choice of affiliation was a life-and-death choice, uncertain in its outcome and weighty in its consequences. In section H we see Yeke-chaqaran and his family thinking about warning Temüjin but deciding to stay with Ong Qan; meanwhile, their servants Badai and Kishlik make their own decision and go to warn Temüjin. By risking their lives in this way Badai and Kishlik gained their freedom and established their families for many generations, whereas Yeke-chaqaran and his son probably did not survive the battle. In all sources we repeatedly see Temüjin, who had a reputation for generosity and fairness, receiving critical information from informants who were usually not noble: besides Badai and Kishlik, other examples in this short passage include Cha’u’ur, Qoridai, Yeder, and Taqai. As a consequence of these continually shifting coalitions, individuals and whole tribes repeatedly found themselves fighting side-by-side with warriors they had only recently been trying to kill. From our perspective this is almost unintelligible, but the Mongols seemingly had no difficulty with this. In part this can be explained by the fact that, for the Mongols, warfare as such was unproblematic: rather than a fight against evil or a breakdown of the cosmic order, war was a sacred opportunity to gain merit. Seemingly, after a battle only the kin of the two coalition leaders contesting for leadership (their “bone” clans) had any issue to settle (which was usually done be executing the losers). The other survivors simply packed up their gear and waited for the next call to battle. From the civilized perspective the ever-changing world of steppe politics, with its almost entire absence of secure positions or permanent affiliations, seems virtually insane – like the Alice-in-Wonderland croquet match in which the ball, the wickets, and the mallets all had their own mind and moved around as they wished. It is not surprising that the steppe was rarely united, and it is amazing that Temüjin or anyone else was able to unite it at all. The Mongol concept of the Qan was inherently unstable. On the one hand, all Mongols admired the strong Qans of legend. On the other, few well-born Mongols were really willing to submit themselves to anyone. Everyone’s first choice was to be Qan, and everyone’s second choice was to remain independent, with the consequence that there would be no Qan. There were, however, unifying tendencies. All Mongols understood that during periods of disunity the Mongols fought among themselves for paltry spoils, whereas the united peoples of the steppe under the great Hsiung-nü, Turkish, and Uighur Qans gained rich plunder and tribute from the sedentary peoples. Furthermore, most Mongols were commoners and could not aspire to be Qan. Their interest was entirely in unity. When individuals or tribal groups submitted themselves or their children to Temüjin they were gambling that he would be the one to unify the Mongols. The many scattered decision of individuals and small groups to change affiliation may seem to be examples of the uncontrollable disorder of the steppe, but in fact they are forces for order. At the beginning of his career (in his first battle against Jamuqa) Temüjin led a clan army, and in many cases he received help from such in-law clans as the Onggirat and the Qongqotan. For him, however, these were only resources to be exploited. Ultimately he destroyed his own clan, killing most of its contemporary members. Temüjin’s policy was to gain the absolute personal loyalty of talented nökör: non-noble followers who might disagree with him in council, but who would not contest his leadership. Temüjin’s policy is sometimes described as “democratic”, since he favored commoners, but in fact he favored them because they were more submissive. His personal unwillingness to share power at all coincided with the Mongol’s perceived need for unity, which is expressed in two forms early in the SH. In SH 76 Temujin’s mother Ho’elun cites Mother Alan’s parable of the arrows (SH 22) to encourage her sons to cooperate, but Temujin does not listen and kills Bekter – his rival for the leadership of Ho’elun’s tiny clan. His model of unity is hierarchal rather than cooperative and is expressed by Bodonchar in SH 33-35: “It’s good for a body to have a head, and for a coat to have a collar.... Those people on the Tunggelik stream just now, they have no big or small, good or bad, head or hooves – everybody’s equal. They are a simple people – let’s go plunder them.” Bekter understands Temujin’s motive” “We are unable to endure our bitterness against our Tayyichi’ut kinsmen and are asking ourselves who of us will settle the score”. Bekter, who had bullying Temujin and Qasar, had expected to lead the family in their quest for vengeance, but Temujin was unwilling to accept his leadership. While Ho’elun’s speech in SH 78 comparing Temujin to various savage beasts was in one respect an angry denunciation, it in the context of the whole Secret History it also amounts to a prophecy that Temujin, a man of transcendent violence and iron will, was the man who would eventually unite the Mongols by destroying all his rivals. Once he had succeeded in doing this by the shrewd manipulation of ties of kinship, intermarriage, sworn brotherhood (anda), and vassalage (nökör) and his strategic mix of generosity, ruthlessness, loyalty, and treachery, world conquest was hardly an intimidating task. NOTES
[lx][i] Wang Kuo-wei (p. 74) prefers a variant “also came to join us”. However, nothing in the text justifies the “also”. Temüjin had friends among the Onggirat, including his father-in-law Deyi-sechen who in a passage just above this one had sent him a warning about an impending attack (SW p. 69). I believe that it is assumed here that the Onggirat were already talking about joining Temüjin when Qasar raided them. [lxi][ii] “Emperor”
(shang): literally “The One Above”, “The High One”, etc. The SW is
notable for its anachronistic and inaccurate use of titles. Thus, Ong Qan is referred to as Ong Qahan,
and once even as Ong Qan Qahan, even though he never held that title. Temüjin is referred to as Emperor from the
beginning, even though he certainly was not an emperor during most of the
period covered. His mother
Hö’elün is referred to as the Queen Mother, a title she never held. [lxii][iii] SW
78-9; SH 141; deR. IV– pp.
78-9. The Gen, Gegen, or Kan, a
tributary of the Ergune. [lxiii][iv] According
to SW, p. 76, the Tülber is a tributary of the Gen. There is a presently a town called Telbür
on the upper reaches of a river (unnamed on my map) which flows into the Gen
near its confluence with the Ergune. [lxiv][v] This
is a conjectural reconstruction, by analogy with the name Cha’ur in
this same fragment which is written identically except without the middle wu. Cha’u’ur and his deed are
mentioned in YS 123, p. 3022. [lxv][vi] The first two sentences could also
be “...the charging troop rode off toward our forces. There was among [Jamuqa’s] troops a
soldier named Taqaiqa.” (This would have to be the translation if the
Chinese verb fu requires a destination.) I have chosen this version because I do not
believe that Jamuqa’s troops went off directly to attack
Temüjin’s forces, but rather to gather their own forces for the
attack. If they had attacked
immediately, there would not have been time to warn Temüjin. (A few lines further down we see
wagon-yurts on their way to Jamuqa’s camp, indicating that Jamuqa’s
force was still assembling.) This is a difficult passage
without exact parallels in the other available texts. While I believe that my translation is
plausible and allowable, I cannot be completely confident about it. [lxvi][vii] The
Qulan or Qulan-ba’atur in SH 48
and 50, Yeke-cheren’s father,
was the brother of Temüjin’s grandfather Bartan-ba’atur. Qulan was the youngest of Qabul’s
sons (PH p. 125) and was much younger than Bartan, so he could easily have
been alive and active at this time; we know (PH pp. 36, 78) that he fought in
Temüjin’s forces in his first battle against Jamuqa. Qulan’s son Yeke-cheren was in
Jamuqa’s camp, as were the Qorulas and the Jurkin, and in the YS
biography of Cha’u’ur ( #123 p. 3022) “Qulan-Yerki”
is named – presumably “Qulan the Jurkin”. It thus seems
likely that Yesügei’s son mentioned here was in Jamuqa’s
camp. (In Rashid vol. II p. 163 Qulan
is described as a Tayyichi’ut, but also as one of the hui-yin irgen
or “forest people”.
Nekun-taishi, Temüjin’s uncle, is also so described; the meaning
is unclear but probably unrelated to the “forest people” of the
Mongol far northwest. On this, see
also Pelliot, pp. 184, 112, 78-81, using a different version of Rashid). [lxxii][xiii] I
cannot identify Bijan. There may be
textual problems here; the previous sentence has no subject. |